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number of initial public 
offerings of stock (IPOs) in hospi­
tality companies has increased sub­
stantially in recent years. From 1991 
through 1994 an average of 16 hos­
pitality companies per year have 
gone public, compared to an average 
of just under seven hospitality IPOs 
per year from 1979 to 1990. In 1992 
numerous restaurant chains went 
public, while casinos rushed to the 
market in 1993. What’s noticeable 
about these transactions is that for 
many of them the offering price is
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professor of finance at Cornell's School 
of Hotel Administration.
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Underwriters may view the primary issue of most hotel and 
casino stocks as more risky than stocks of new companies 
generally. Still, newly issued stocks of hospitality companies 
have generally outperformed the market in their first year.
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substantially lower than the first 
day’s closing price in the secondary 
market. The average initial-day re­
turn for all hospitality issues is 16.32 
percent, as compared to 15.26 per­
cent in the overall IPO market.1 
That is not a large difference, but as 
I will explain, certain industry seg­
ments encounter considerable un­
derpricing.
Moreover, on average, hospitality 
IPO investors earn a higher first- 
year return than other IPO inves­
tors. During the period of my study, 
hospitality investors earned an aver­
age excess return of 14.11 percent, 
relative to the Standard and Poor’s 
average of 500 stocks (S&P 500), in 
the year following the IPO. In con­
trast, the average IPO return for the 
overall IPO market was less than the 
return on the S&P 500. Examining 
restaurant and lodging—casino IPOs 
separately, lodging—casino IPOs are 
underpriced more than the overall 
IPO market, although the under­
writers considered to be above- 
average in reputation underprice 
their IPOs by a smaller amount 
than underwriters who are less- 
established.
This paper analyzes the pricing 
and long-run performance of initial 
public offerings of stock in hospital­
ity companies, and compares those 
results to the overall market for 
IPOs. This comparison is useful 
both to entrepreneurs who are con­
sidering making an initial stock 
offering and to investors who might 
wish to purchase newly issued stock. 
Sellers can use the information to 
choose an underwriter and to evalu­
ate the performance of investment 
banks in marketing and pricing 
IPOs. Investors can gauge how to 
maximize their expected return per 
unit of risk. I start by describing the 
process of going public and then
1 The initial-day return is the difference be­
tween the closing price and the offer price as a 
percentage of the offer price, at the close of the 
first day of trading.
present the main theoretical expla­
nations of IPO underpricing. These 
explanations provide a framework 
for comparing underpricing and 
long-run performance of hospital­
ity-company IPOs with the overall 
IPO market’s performance. I analyze 
the relationship of the initial-day 
return and risk with the long-run 
performance of IPOs. As an instruc­
tive case, I also note the perfor­
mance of one of the most famous 
and successful IPOs in the hospital­
ity industry, that of Boston Chicken.
Going Public
Most companies get their initial 
equity capital from a small number 
of investors.2 This form of financing 
is relatively illiquid, however, as 
there is no ready market to accom­
modate those investors who later 
wish to sell their ownership share of 
the company. If a company prospers 
and needs additional equity capital, 
its owners may eventually decide to 
sell stock shares to a large number 
of investors in a public offering. 
Compared to privately held invest­
ments, going public allows the com­
pany to raise capital on more favor­
able terms, makes capital more 
readily available, allows the original 
owners to diversify their holdings, 
and provides management and 
shareholders with a gauge of the 
firm’s value based on the publicly 
traded price.
By making the decision to go 
public, the would-be issuer of stock 
is deciding to sell a portion of the 
firm. It stands to reason that the 
principals want to receive as much 
money as possible in return for a 
share of the company. The price at 
which the company can trade own­
ership for cash depends on overall
2 For example, the New England Applebee’s 
franchisee started with an investor pool of two, 
the owner and one financial backer. See: Michael 
L. Oshins,“‘Skip’ Sack and Applebee’s: How Pub 
Ventures Went Public,” Cornell Hotel and Restau­
rant Administration Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 3 (June 
1996), pp. 55-63.
market conditions, the firm’s specific 
situation, and the policies of the 
investment bankers underwriting 
the issue.
New issuers search for the best 
underwriter and the most favorable 
conditions possible. A firm that 
wants to go public seeks the assis­
tance of an underwriter or syndicate 
of underwriters. An IPO is the re­
sult of a match between the issuer 
and the underwriter. The issuer 
prefers the most prestigious under­
writer possible—that is, a firm 
known for bringing high-quality 
companies to market. The under­
writing firm’s notoriety provides a 
favorable signal to the market. Pres­
tigious investment banking firms, 
however, remain that way only by 
carefully choosing the firms they 
agree to underwrite, often refusing 
speculative issues.
Best efforts. The offering can 
be made by either of two methods, 
“best efforts” or “firm commit­
ment.” In best-efforts contracts, the 
issuer and underwriter negotiate an 
offering price. The underwriter 
then uses its best efforts to raise all 
of the desired capital at the negoti­
ated price, usually receiving a per­
centage of the capital raised as its 
fee. If there is not enough demand 
at the established price, the offer is 
withdrawn from the market and the 
issuer raises no capital. Moreover, it 
is unlikely that a second offering 
will be made at a lower price. The 
best-efforts offering minimizes the 
risk faced by the underwriter and 
leaves most of the risk to be borne 
by the issuer.
Firm commitment. In the
more-common firm-commitment 
offering, by contrast, the under­
writer guarantees that a specific 
amount of capital will be raised. In 
effect, the underwriter buys all of 
the stock issued at an agreed-upon 
price (with a price spread intended 
to compensate the underwriter) and 
is then responsible for selling it all.
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The underwriter may later reduce 
the public-offering price to clear 
the market, but nonetheless delivers 
to the issuer the entire sum that 
was originally specified. In a firm- 
commitment offering, then, it is 
crucial to the underwriter that the 
initial price be set appropriately
Both the issuer and the under­
writer of an IPO must comply with 
the Securities Act of 1933, which 
requires disclosure of certain infor­
mation to potential investors and 
gives them the right to sue if there is 
misleading information or material 
omission of fact. The restrictions are 
stricter for offerings greater than 
$7.5 million in gross proceeds 
(known as S-l offerings, after the 
code section that pertains to them) 
than they are for those of less than 
$7.5 million (S-l8 offerings). Offer­
ings of less than $1.5 million in 
gross proceeds are eligible for their 
own treatment under the act’s 
Regulation A, which involves even 
fewer disclosure requirements.
Regulations promulgated by the 
Securities and Exchange Commis­
sion (SEC) under the 1933 act re­
quire the underwriter, after investi­
gating the issuing firm, to file 
specific information (e.g., type of 
business, nature of security, financial 
statements) in a preliminary pro­
spectus. Then there is a period of at 
least 20 days, during which the SEC 
reviews the submitted material. 
During this “cooling off” period, 
the underwriter surveys the market 
and sends information to prospec­
tive investors.
In a firm-commitment offering, 
investors are asked to indicate their 
willingness to purchase shares at 
some price (i.e., to “circle” their 
demand). The underwriter uses the 
responses to set the offering price. 
The final price is usually set at a 
pricing meeting the afternoon be­
fore the formal offering.
Setting an appropriate price is 
crucial to a successful IPO. Even
after the underwriter surveys the 
market and investigates the issuer, 
however, considerable uncertainty 
remains about how the broad mar­
ket will receive the issue. The diffi­
culty in pricing arises from the fact 
that IPO firms, by definition, have 
no price history. A final point re­
garding the IPO process is that the 
investors who have the first chance 
at the stock are those who are in­
vited by the underwriter. The gen­
eral public is usually in a secondary 
position of buying stock from the 
investors who, in turn, purchased it 
at the offering price set by the un­
derwriter. This point is important in 
considering the potential gains of 
would-be IPO investors.
IPO Underpricing
While managers of a firm going 
public are eager to secure the high­
est possible price for their stock, the 
underwriters of a firm-commitment 
offering are likely to be cautious 
because they will be left with any 
unsold stock if they overestimate 
investor demand at a given price. As 
a result, underwriters typically try to 
underprice the IPO. Underpricing, 
they argue, is necessary to reduce 
the cost of marketing the issue to 
customers and to tempt investors to 
buy the stock. The accompanying 
sidebar on Boston Chicken’s IPO 
gives an example of underpricing.
IPO underpricing is a well- 
documented phenomenon.3 An 
historical analysis published in 1994, 
for example, found that the average 
first-day IPO return was 15.26 per­
cent in the years 1960—1992.4 Sev-
3 Among the first to document apparent under- 
pricing were: D. Logue, “On the Pricing of 
Unseasoned Equity Issues, 1965-69 ''Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis,Vol. 8 (1973), 
pp. 91-103; and Roger Ibbotson, “Price Perfor­
mance of Common Stock New Issues,” Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vo1. 2 (1975), pp. 235-272.
4 Roger G. Ibbotson, Jody L. Sindelar, and Jay 
R. R itter,“The Markets Problems with the 
Pricing of Initial Public Offerings,” Journal of 
Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 7 (1994), pp. 66—74.
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eral reasons have been proposed to 
explain why a firm would willingly 
underprice its securities and thereby 
limit the funds received for selling 
a share of the company. The two 
main theoretical explanations are 
the winner’s curse5 and signaling- 
based models.6 *
Winner’s curse. The winner’s 
curse model is drawn from auctions. 
The highest bidder in an auction for 
a given item is the participant who 
places the highest value on the auc­
tioned object. The winner’s curse 
proposes that the winning bidder 
has an overly optimistic assessment 
of the object’s true value. By win­
ning the auction, according to this 
logic, one has overpaid for the item. 
In the case of IPOs, the ability to 
purchase an allotment of shares may 
signal that the stock is overpriced. 
Otherwise, knowledgeable buyers 
would have subscribed the entire 
issue.
For stock issues, the winner’s 
curse concept is based on the same 
idea that some investors are less 
informed than others. Unless those 
less-expert investors can spot which 
issues are underpriced, the unin­
formed investors are likely to sub­
scribe a small proportion of the 
cheap issues (compared to knowl­
edgeable investors) and a large pro­
portion of the expensive ones.
Here’s why: If an issue is under- 
priced, both informed and unin­
3K. Rock, “Why New Issues are Underpriced,” 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 15 (1986), 
pp. 187-212; R. Beatty and Jay Ritter, “Invest­
ment Banking, Reputation, and the Underpric­
ing of Initial Public Offerings J  Journal of Finan­
cial Economics, Vol. 15 (1986), pp. 213-232; and 
R. Carter and S. Manaster, “Initial Public Offer­
ing and Underwriter Reputation,'n Journal of
Finance, Vol. 45 (1990), pp. 1045-1067.
6 F Allen and G. Faulhaber, “Signaling by 
Underpricing in the IPO MarketJJournal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 23 (1989), pp. 303-323; 
M. Grinblatt and C. FIwang, “Signaling and the 
Pricing of New Issues f  Journal of Finance, Vol. 44 
(1989), pp. 393-420; and I.Welch,“Seasoned 
Offerings, Imitation Costs and the Underpricing 
of Initial Public O fferingsJournal of Finance,
Vol. 44 (1989), pp. 421-449.
N A N C E
formed investors will want to buy it. 
The uninformed investors are pur­
chasing IPO stocks more or less 
indiscriminately, while the informed 
investors recognize an underpriced 
stock as a wise investment. Because 
everyone wants some of the under- 
priced stock, the underwriters 
will not have enough stock to go 
around, and both types of investors 
are likely to get only a small share of 
a hot issue. If the stock is over­
priced, on the other hand, informed 
investors are unlikely to want it and 
the underwriter will be only too 
delighted to sell it to the unin­
formed. When the uninformed in­
vestor “wins” and gets her entire 
allocation in this scenario, it may be 
because those who knew better— 
the informed—avoided the issue.
Having been burned enough 
times, the uninformed investors will 
eventually stop subscribing to IPOs 
altogether, making it difficult for the 
underwriters to place their stock. To 
counteract that possibility, the un­
derwriter must price the stock low 
enough for the uninformed investor 
to make money on enough invest­
ments to keep her in the market. 
(Most investors recognize that some 
portions of a portfolio will lose 
money, while others will do well.) 
Since uninformed investors will 
subscribe to the issues only if there 
is substantial underpricing, the only 
way underwriters can counteract 
the winner’s curse and attract the 
average investor is to underprice 
new issues (on average) so that this 
investor still makes a profit.
One of the implications of the 
winner’s curse model is that riskier 
issues should have, on average, 
greater underpricing. Two different 
studies found that the greater an 
investment-banking firm’s prestige 
the lower the risk of the IPOs with 
which the firm is associated.7 To
7 See: Rock, pp. 187-212; and Carter and 
Manaster, pp. 1045—1067.
preserve their reputations, presti­
gious underwriters screen the firms 
that go public and select the less- 
risky ones by using information 
unavailable to the general public. 
This, in turn, reduces the uncer­
tainty and information asymmetry 
between informed and uninformed 
investors. Investors know that they 
can limit their risk by subscribing to 
issues of reputable investment banks. 
Consequently, the underwriters feel 
less obligation to underprice well- 
chosen issues to attract investors, 
and the initial-day return should be 
lower for screened issues than for 
those that the underwriters regard as 
more risky. As a result, the degree of 
underpricing and future perfor­
mance should be related to the 
reputation of the underwriter. I 
examine this relationship below.
Signaling. The other main ex­
planation for underpricing a stock 
issue is that price is a signaling de­
vice. One researcher conjectured 
that new issues may be underpriced 
to “leave a good taste in investors’ 
mouths.”8 Picking up on that thread, 
other studies hypothesized that the 
owner’s incentive to leave a good 
taste with investors is due to the 
possibility of the owner’s subse­
quently coming back to the market 
for the sale of additional securities 
on more favorable terms.9 That is, 
the underpriced new issues are said 
to “leave a good taste” with inves­
tors (because the investors profit 
from them), allowing companies to 
sell future offerings at a higher price 
than would otherwise be the case.
Sample Description and 
Empirical Results
My sample firms were obtained 
from the annual editions of the 
Directory of Corporate Financing and 
from Securities Data Company
8 Ibbotson (1975), p. 270.
9 See: Allen and Faulhaber, pp. 303-323;
Grinblatt and Hwang, pp. 393-420; and Welch,
pp. 421-449.
(SDC). I selected firms for analysis 
from the list of corporate securities 
offerings if (1) the firm’s primary 
business was in the hospitality in­
dustry (SIC codes 5812 or 7011);
(2) they made a firm-commitment 
offering of at least $1 per unit; (3) 
the unit contained only a single 
share of stock (no warrants at­
tached);10 *(4 ) the issue was an initial 
public offering; and (5 ) the firm 
was subsequently listed on the Uni­
versity of Chicago Center for Re­
search in Security Prices (CRSP), 
NASDAQ, American Stock Ex­
change (AMEX), or New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) daily tapes. 
A total of 143 firm offerings met all 
five requirements.
The initial return was calculated 
using the offer price and the first- 
day closing price. It is defined 
throughout this paper as:
closing price on first day of 
trading -  offer price
day = --------------------------------------------
retum offer price
The offer price is taken from the 
Directory of Corporate Financing and 
from SDC. The first-day closing 
price is taken from the 1994 CRSP 
tapes when available; otherwise, it is 
collected from the Wall Street Journal.
The long-run performance was 
the one-year excess return of the 
stock compared to the S&P 500’s 
return for the same period, calcu­
lated as the stock’s geometric return 
starting with the day after the firm 
went public, minus the S&P 500 
geometric market return for the 
same period. In each case I recorded 
the IPOs’ lead underwriter, as sup­
plied by SDC. This sample involved 
77 different underwriters. In nine 
transactions just one underwriter 
leads, two underwriters lead in ap­
proximately six of the transactions,
10 Purchasing a warrant gives the investor the 
right to exchange the warrant for stock in the 
company when the stock is issued. Warrants are 
traded like stock shares; that is, the prices of both 
vary according to market demand.
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Boston Chicken’s IPO
Gauging by the firm's reception in the market, 
Boston Chicken (which operates and fran­
chises Boston Market restaurants) launched 
one of the most successful IPOs of the past 
three years. This transaction demonstrates 
the characteristics of a successful IPO: an 
easily understood product, an impressive 
management resume, a well-planned “road 
show" (to inform and encourage investors), 
and a reputable underwriter, the firm of 
Merrill Lynch.
In addition, Boston Chicken’s timing was 
impeccable and demand was high, partly be­
cause the IPO market was in a hot phase. In 
the offering, the orders placed by individual 
investors went unfilled (as often happens). 
Fund managers snapped up the IPO, and in­
dividual investors could buy shares only after 
the stock started trading—at considerably 
higher prices than the offering price.
On November 8,1993, Boston Chicken 
offered 1.9 million shares at $20 per share. In 
the secondary market, trading started at 
$45.25 per share, reached a high of $51, and 
closed at $48.50. Boston Chicken made IPO 
history by soaring nearly $30 above its initial 
price, or about 143 percent, in one day. (It 
was not until early 1996 that this performance 
was matched, when Netscape's IPO 
achieved similar numbers.)
Boston Chicken raised $38 million from its 
IPO. However, by the end of the first trading 
day, the stock was valued at $92 million. 
Therefore, Merrill Lynch underpriced the of­
fering by $54 million. Such underpricing ben­
efits the investor at a cost to the issuing firm 
and to the benefit of the underwriter, which 
makes certain of selling its shares. The 
greater the underpricing, the less money the 
issuer receives for the portion of the company 
sold. Thus, underpricing represents an indi­
rect cost of issuing new securities. In this 
case, the cost was high.
One year later, Boston Chicken was trad­
ing at $38.25 (adjusted for stock splits). This 
represents a yearly return of 91.25 percent 
based on the offer price, or -21.1 percent 
based on the closing price on the first day of 
trading in the secondary market. The annual 
return on the S&P 500 over this period was 
about 1.51 percent. The primary investors 
outperformed the S&P 500, but the second­
ary investors who had bought it at the closing 
price on the first day of trading clearly 
underperformed the S&P 500.
This example is typical—on average, the 
offering price is lower that the closing price 
on the first day. Thus, subscribers earn an 
extraordinary return if they sell early. How­
ever, over a holding period of a year, the in­
vestment does not outperform the S&P 500, 
based on the closing price in the secondary 
market.
Underpricing represents a cost to the 
existing owners, since the new investors 
are allowed to buy shares in the firm at a fa­
vorable price. The cost of underpricing can 
be very large as was the case with Boston 
Chicken.—L.C.
and nine underwriters lead in three 
or four transactions.The variable of 
underwriter reputation was based on 
rankings supplied by SDC. Its rank­
ings are based on the value of the 
IPOs underwritten by the invest­
ment bank as of the end of 1994.
Many Happy Returns...
The average return for the first trad­
ing day for the 143 hospitality firms 
in my sample is 16.32 percent (see 
Exhibit 1). This initial-day return is 
insignificantly greater than the aver­
age initial-day return of 15.72 per­
cent for the overall IPO market in 
the same 1979-1994 period.11 The 
range of initial returns in the hospi­
tality industry is dramatic, with a 
minimum first-day return of -43.75 
percent and a maximum of 150 
percent. Nearly 76 percent of the 
firms experienced positive first-day 
returns, and 12.6 percent incurred 
negative returns, while 11.4 percent 
showed no price movement at all.
On average, the degree of under- 
pricing of hospitality-industry IPOs 
was similar to the level of under- 
pricing in the market as a whole.
The dollar size of the IPO also 
varies greatly across the sample. The 
mean dollar value of each transac­
tion is $20.22 million, but the IPOs 
range between $1.5 million and 
$294 million. The average size of the 
hospitality-company offerings is less 
than the average size in the overall 
market, which is about $30 million.
...But Not All Are Happy
The IPO market experiences hot 
and cold cycles. That is, the number 
of offerings varies substantially across 
different time periods. The overall 
market, for example, recorded 198 
offerings in 1982 versus 848 offer­
ings in 1983.12 To identify whether 
there are similar cycles in the hospi-
11 See: Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter (1994), 
pp. 66-74.
12 Ibid.
tality industry, I categorized the data 
sample by year. As shown in Exhibit 
2, the number of offerings in the 
hospitality industry varied by year, 
from a low of one in 1980 to a high 
of 23 in 1993. The table also shows 
the great variation in the average 
initial return across years, from a low 
o f -3.58 percent in 1990 to 57.38 
percent in 1979. Most of the time, 
the average initial return is positive. 
In fact, the average initial return is 
positive in 14 out of the 16 years in 
the sample period.
The table in Exhibit 2 shows that 
the hospitality industry participates 
in the hot and cold cycles that char­
acterize the general market. For 
example, 1991-1994 was a hot cycle 
for both. The mid-1980s was also a 
hot period (1983—1987 for the gen­
eral market and 1981—1986 for the 
hospitality industry). The mean 
number of offerings per year during 
a hot cycle was 12.5 compared to 
only three during cold cycles.
Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter 
twice demonstrated that for the 
entire market, hot cycles are associ­
ated with relatively high average 
initial returns and cold cycles with 
lower average initial returns.13 This 
implies that firms that issue shares 
during high-volume periods typi­
cally experience high initial price 
run-ups. In other words, periods of 
high volume are associated with 
periods of high discounts in the 
primary market.
On average, however, that rela­
tionship did not appear to hold for 
hospitality firms (see Exhibit 3). In 
fact, the opposite was true: the aver­
age initial return was lower during 
hot cycles (16.21 percent) and 
higher during the cold cycles (17.11 
percent).14
13 Roger G. Ibbotson, Jody L. Sindelar, and Jay 
R. Ritter, “Initial Public Offerings,'” Journal of 
Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 1 (1988), pp. 37-45; 
and Ibbotson et al. (1994), pp. 66-74.
14 The difference between the average initial 
return in the two cycles is insignificantly differ­
ent from zero.
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Casinos, Hotels, and Restaurants
To gain a better understanding of 
the nature of underpricing among 
hospitality companies, I divided the 
sample into restaurants (SIC code 
5812) and hotels and casino-hotels 
(SIC code 7011). This allowed me 
to investigate whether the charac­
teristics of lodging and casino IPOs 
are different from those of restau­
rant IPOs.
The differences between the two 
industry divisions are dramatic, as 
shown in Exhibit 4. The average 
initial return for lodging—casino 
properties (22.46 percent) is signifi­
cantly higher than for restaurants 
(14.62 percent). In addition, the 
average size of hotel and casino 
offerings—$43.46 million—is sub­
stantially greater than for the res­
taurant IPOs—at $13.80 million. 
Moreover, the number of restaurant 
IPOs is four times greater than the 
number of lodging—casino IPOs.
Until recently, the IPO activity 
in lodging—casino properties consti­
tuted a small but steady stream.
IPOs have only recently become 
popular in the lodging-casino seg­
ment. In fact, 17 out of the 31 IPOs 
were issued in 1992-1994, or just 
three years of the 16-year sample. It 
is noteworthy that the level of un­
derpricing for the lodging—casino 
IPOs consistently fell during this 
period (as gauged by the plunge in 
initial-day returns). The 1992-1994 
hot cycle for lodging—casino IPOs 
coincided with the industry’s eco­
nomic recovery. Restaurant IPOs, 
on the other hand, came in batches. 
Ninety percent of all restaurant 
IPOs occurred during the hot- 
cycle periods of 1981—1986 and 
1991-1994.
Blowing hot and cold. The
pattern of initial-day returns in hot 
and cold cycles is mixed in the two 
hospitality-industry segments. For 
restaurants, the hot cycle is associ­
ated with high average initial re­
turns and the cold cycle with low
Exhibit 1
Initial-day return and size of hospital




Based on 143 observations between 1979 and 1994.
For all exhibits, the initial-day return is defined as:
initial-day return =
The IPO size is defined as the offer price times the ni
tty IPOs




closing price on first day of 
trading -  offer price
offer price
jmber of shares offered.
Exhibit 2
Hospitality IPOs compared with the overall IPO market
---------Hospitality Industry--------------- --------Overall Market------------
Average Average Average
Number initial-day IPO size Number initial-day
Year of IPOs return ($ millions) of IPOs return
1979 3 i m b m $42.10 103 24.61%
1980 1 1.48 4.10 259 49.38
1981 9 12.46 7.71 438 16.76
1982 8 8.74 18.23 198 20.31
1983 17 9.85 14.51 848 20.79
1984 8 5.31 16.21 516 11.52
1985 8 9.17 9.18 507 12.36
1986 11 14.35 5.69 953 9.99
1987 3 -0.57 21.77 630 10.39
1988 2 57.69 3.60 435 5.27
1989 6 5.24 19.22 371 6.47
1990 3 -3.58 10.10 276 9.47
1991 10 21.31 27.59 367 11.83
1992 17 20.35 25.36 509 10.90
1993 23 28.37 39.97 NA NA
1994 14 13.65 15.76 NA NA
Total 143 16.32 20.22 6,410 15.72
Exhibit 3
Initial-day hospitality IPO returns
Hot Cycles Cold Cycles
(1981-86, ’91-94) (1979-80, ’87-90)
Average initial-day return 16.21% 17.11%
Average IPO size ($ millions) $20.59 $17.67
Number of IPOs 125 18
Exhibit 4
Comparison of restaurant and lodging-casino IPOs
Restaurants Lodging-Casinos
(SIC Code 5812) (SIC Code 7011)
Average initial-day return 14.62% 22.46%
Average IPO size ($ millions) $13.80 $43.46
Number of IPOs 112 31
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Exhibit 5
Results of hospitality IPOs by segment
Number of IPOs Average Initial-Day 
Return









1979 2 1 86.50% -0.86% $42.10 $11.60
1980 0 1 — 1.48 — 4.10
1981 0 9 — 12.46 — 7.71
1982 1 7 0.62 9.89 100.00 6.56
1983 1 16 8.33 9.95 60.00 11.66
1984 1 7 0.00 6.06 51.00 11.24
1985 3 5 4.91 11.73 14.80 5.80
1986 2 9 8.56 15.64 10.35 4.66
1987 0 I 3 — -0.57 — 21.77
1988 1 1 100.00 15.38 2.00 5.20
1989 1 5 35.42 -0.80 3.00 22.46
1990 1 2 -18.75 4.01 3.50 13.40
1991 1 9 75.00 15.35 12.00 29.32
1992 4 13 24.96 15.85 43.32 19.83
1993 8 15 13.34 36.39 83.78 16.60
1994 5 9 8.84 16.33 24.60 10.84
Exhibit 6
Effects of hot and cold cycles on hospitality IPOs
Lodging-Casino IPOs Restaurant IPOs
Hot Cycle Cold Cycle Hot Cycle Cold Cycle
Average initial-day return 















Underwriter prestige and hospitality IPO returns
All hospitality Lodging-Casinos Restaurants
High Low High Low High Low
prestige prestige prestige prestige prestige prestige
Initial return 16.81% 15.99% 18.22% 26.98% 16.27% 13.63%
IPO size ($millions) $36.61 $9.05 $66.94 $18.41 $25.05 $7.04
Number of IPOs 58 85 16 15 42 70
average initial returns (see Exhibit 
6). This relationship does not hold 
for the lodging—casino firms. Dur­
ing hot cycles, the average initial 
return is lower than during the cold 
cycle. The average initial return 
during the hot cycle is 17.10 per­
cent, but that return is 28.96 per­
cent during the cold cycle. These 
results are not conclusive, since the 
hot cycle coincides with the 
industry’s economic recovery.15 
Notice that for lodging—casino 
firms, the level of underpricing 
consistently falls during the 1992- 
1994 period. The decline could be 
due to the market’s increasing expe­
rience with IPOs in the industry or 
a reduction in uncertainty about 
the industry’s future prospects.
The Winner’s Curse
As I stated above, one of the impli­
cations of the winner’s curse model 
is that as an issue’s risk level in­
creases so should the level of under- 
pricing. Also as mentioned above, 
the most-prestigious investment 
bankers are associated with the 
least-risky IPOs. As a result, the 
more prestigious underwriters 
should be associated with less un­
derpricing relative to the averages. 
The overall IPO market demon­
strates this inverse relationship 
between the reputation of the 
underwriter and the level of 
underpricing.
For the hospitality IPOs in my 
sample, however, the reverse rela­
tionship holds, although the differ­
ence is not statistically significant. 
The more-prestigious underwriters 
underprice hospitality issues more 
than do the less-prestigious firms (as 
shown in Exhibit 7).The under-
1:5 When the industry’s recession was isolated as 
a separate period—with 1988—1991 defined as a 
cold cycle and 1979-1987 and 1992-1994 as hot 
cycles—the average initial returns were 47.92 
percent for the cold cycle and 18.69 percent for 
the hot period.
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Exhibit 8
Initial-day and first-year excess returns for hospitality IPOs
250-day excess return* Initial-day return
Hospitality 14.11% 16.32%
Lodging and casinos 10.24 22.46
Restaurants 14.96 14.62
*Excess return is the stocks’ geometric return compared to that of the Standard and 
Poor’s average of 500 stocks.
Exhibit 9
Underwriter prestige and excess return
------------- Prestigious--------------  --------Less Prestigious
1979-94 1979-91 1992-94 1979-94 1979-91 1992-94
250-day
excess return 10.65% 0.81% 27.26% 16.98% 13.28% 34.66%
The excess return is the stock’s geometric return that exceeds that of the S&P 500 
stocks. The prestigious underwriters are defined as the top 10 underwriters in terms of 
capital position.
pricing of lodging—casino properties 
by prestigious underwriters, how­
ever, is significantly lower than for 
IPOs as a whole.
Long-Run Performance
A general characteristic of IPOs is 
their poor stock-price performance 
in the long run relative to the gen­
eral market.16 That is, after the ini­
tial-day price run-up, IPOs as a 
group do not prosper. This phe­
nomenon is not evident in the hos­
pitality industry, however, as shown 
in Exhibit 8. Unlike the overall IPO 
market, IPOs in the hospitality in­
dustry outperform the S&P 500 in 
the long run. For example, over a 
250-day holding period, the average 
return on the sample of hospitality 
IPO firms was 14.11 percent higher 
than the S&P 500 return.
Restaurants generally did better 
than lodging and casino firms, but 
both groups outperformed the mar­
ket. The 250-day excess returns for 
restaurants was 14.96 percent, while 
that figure for lodging-casino firms 
is 10.24 percent.
Notice that the excess return for 
lodging—casino IPOs is less than that 
of restaurant issues but that lodging- 
casino IPOs’ underpricing is greater 
than that of restaurant stocks. This 
provides some evidence of a positive 
association between underpricing 
and performance over the 1979— 
1994 period.
The differences in the relation­
ship between the degree of under- 
pricing and long-run performance 
over the two time periods could be 
due to the difference in the propor­
tion of IPOs underwritten by the 
more reputable investment banks 
over the two periods or to the re­
covery of the lodging—casino indus­
try. Over the 1979—1994 period,
41 percent of the IPOs are repre­
16 See: Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter (1994), 
pp. 66—74.
sented by the top investment banks, 
but that figure rises to 52 percent 
during the 1992-1994 period. In an 
attempt to isolate these two factors, 
Exhibit 9 presents the 250-day ex­
cess return for prestigious and less 
prestigious investment banks for 
three time periods: 1979-1994, 
1979-1991 and 1992-1994.The 
250-day excess return is less for the 
more-reputable investment banks 
over the entire period and over 
each of the two subperiods. It is 
possible that the prestige of the 
investment bank is a proxy for the 
riskiness of the issue. Given that the 
more reputable investment banks 
underwrite less risky IPOs, the 
expected return should be lower, 
on average.
Mixed News for Issuers and Investors
Compared to the pricing of initial 
restaurant issues and the overall 
IPO market, underwriters generally 
underpriced lodging—casino stocks 
over the 1979—1994 period of my
study. As for the IPO market as a 
whole, hospitality IPOs saw hot and 
cold cycles in both volume and the 
extent of underpricing, with a posi­
tive association between underpric­
ing and number of issues for restau­
rants and a negative relationship 
between underpricing and the eco­
nomic condition of the industry for 
lodging—casino stocks. For lodging- 
casino stocks, the study’s findings 
were in keeping with the concept 
that the prestige of the underwriter 
is a proxy for the riskiness of the 
issue. Specifically, the more presti­
gious underwriters discount the 
issues less than their less-well- 
known competitors. Perhaps the 
most encouraging finding was that, 
unlike the overall IPO market, IPOs 
in the hospitality industry generally 
outperform the S&P 500 in the first 
year after issue. That is favorable 
news for both the investors who 
wish a favorable return and for en­
trepreneurs who hope to sell their 
shares at a favorable price. CQ
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